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Abstract. Performing a comprehensive side-channel analysis evaluation
of small embedded devices is a process known for its variability and
complexity. In real-world experimental setups, the results are largely in-
fluenced by a huge amount of parameters that are not easily adjusted
without trial and error and are heavily relying on the experience of profes-
sional security analysts. In this paper, we advocate the use of an existing
statistical methodology called Six Sigma (6σ) for side-channel analysis
optimization for this purpose. This well-known methodology is commonly
used in other industrial fields, such as production and quality engineer-
ing, to reduce the variability of industrial processes. We propose a cus-
tomized Six Sigma methodology, which enables even a less-experienced
security analysis to select optimal values for the different variables that
are critical for the side-channel analysis procedure. Moreover, we show
how our methodology helps in improving different phases in the side-
channel analysis process.
Keywords: Cryptographic hardware, Deep Learning, Side-channel analysis, Six
Sigma
1 Introduction
The process of obtaining data for Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) is a complex
procedure in which not only the acquisition of thousands or even millions of
power or EM traces is needed, but also the usage of signal processing techniques
in combination with advanced statistical and mathematical tools is most of the
times mandatory. In every step of this path, many decisions have to be taken
most commonly based on the know-how of the people who have dealt with this
kind of issues in the past. Obtaining data for SCA (and performing the SCA it-
self) is an unpredictable process in which decisions are usually taken via repeated
“trial and error”. Moreover, building a proper experimental setup is often a non-
repetitive task, namely what is appropriate for one device can be inefficient for
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others. In common scenarios, security analysts deal with lots of parameters to
tune and choices to make. Thus, no wonder that at the end of the day, when good
results arise after a huge amount of changes applied on the spot, analysts often
do not know exactly what decision or what parameter caused the improvement
of the results. In practice, as the Pareto principle postulates [12], there are a few
parameters that have a strong influence in the results (vital few) against lots of
parameters whose impact in the results is negligible (trivial many). It is not easy
to find one parameter (or a group of parameters) that causes the biggest effect
on the experiment. Therefore, it is important to use a suitable methodology to
perform an experimentation process with those characteristics.
Six Sigma is a well-known statistical methodology targeted to improve indus-
trial processes (production and quality engineering) by reducing its variability.
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been used before to reduce the uncer-
tainty of an SCA process. We develop a customized version of Six Sigma to make
it fit to the SCA requirements and to be able to use it in optimizing each one of
the SCA phases e.g. acquisition, leakage assessment and attacking phase. After
applying the methodology, we were able to select the best values for the different
parameters analyzed within distinct SCA scenarios. In addition, it helped us in
finding the most relevant parameters for the analyses results.
Problem statement: Systematically keeping track of the parameters in an eval-
uation or an attack scenario is not trivial, and also not feasible without a well-
defined procedure. The current state-of-the-art approach is often experimental
and founded on previous experiences. However, this strategy does not give much
insight in the choice of the parameters that could have the most impact on the
results.
Our contribution: In this paper, we do not claim having developed a new method-
ology for leakage assessments nor for performing new attacks on a device. In-
stead, we present an approach that not only complements leakage assessment
techniques, but also enhances attacking scenario setups. This is done without
the need for any new resources (in time or power). We claim that, by using this
new methodology, one could reduce the uncertainty associated with those, often
cumbersome, techniques. The goal is to help lab technicians (or even product
developers), who may not have a deep knowledge of all the statistical and signal
processing concepts involved in these methods, to perform a sound side-channel
evaluation and interpret the results properly. In the case of a more experienced
evaluator, to use the methodology when he faces a new set of devices or data
sets could lead him to discover the best set of variables, that impact the most
with regard to the new task just by conducting it at least one time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces main con-
cepts of the Six Sigma methodology, explains its main steps and connects it to
the practical use cases. The goal of our use cases is to show how Six Sigma can
help in optimizing each one of the side channel analysis phases, including ac-
quisition setup optimization (Sect. 3), attack optimization (Sect. 4) and leakage
assessment optimization (Sections 5 and 6). Finally, Sect. 7, concludes the paper.
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2 Six Sigma Methodology
The Six Sigma (6σ) methodology was created in 1986 by Bill Smith, while work-
ing as an engineer at Motorola, as the company that registered the term as its
trademark in 1993 [19]. The primary objective was to minimize the variability of
the output of a process. To achieve this, different empirical quality management
methods, along with statistical methods are used. In this improvement process
some steps have to be repeated until the main goal is reached.
Six Sigma involves two main methodologies implicitly, which are the basis
for the process management and optimization, and also for the guidelines pro-
posed in this document. The methodologies are: Define-Measure-Analyze-
Improve-Control (DMAIC) and Define-Measure-Analyze-Design-Verify
(DMADV). The former aims at improving an existing process, whilst the latter
aims at designing a new process. Both are based on the Deming’s Plan-Do-
Check-Act Cycle [33,7]. Although those two methodologies are similar, we focus
on DMAIC, because our aim is to improve the selection of parameters for an
SCA process, and not to design the process itself. The steps of the methodology
are shown in Figure 1, pointing how they fit in an SCA evaluation use case (a
detailed explanation can be found in Sect. 3).
Define
Study DUT
& establish
main goals
Measure
Brainstorming
(Determine
variables)
Analyze
Design of
Experiments
(DoE)
Improve
Interpret DoE
results &
apply changes
Control
Not strictly
applicable
Fig. 1. Customized Six Sigma methodology steps.
– Define the system. Here, as the system’s inputs we envision the client’s
requirements and the goal of the project i.e. evaluation. In our case, the
“Define phase” is basically the study of the Device Under Test (DUT). When
a “black-box” evaluation is performed, one deals with a device with almost
no information about its internals. Nevertheless, in a “white-box” evaluation
there are also some variables with less certainty e.g., working frequency,
algorithm implementation details, location of the cryptographic operations
etc. Depending on how evaluators define their goal, the “uncertain” variables
are revealed systematically by the end of the whole process. In this step, one
defines not only the main goal(s) but also the OK-criterion. The proper
definition of those helps to minimize the uncertainties. We interpret this
OK-criterion as the quantification of the goal we want to achieve. In other
words, this implies the definition of a factor that allows us to decide if the
experiments are conclusive or not. A more detailed explanation can be found
in the “Define” section of use cases, i.e. Sect. 3.2, 4.2, and 5.3.
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– Measure the current process setup. To characterize the current state of
the process, one collects its parameters and outputs. In our case, a few
preliminary acquisitions of side-channel signals should be done, to be used
as a baseline for the results that are meant to be improved. The objective
is to define the variables/parameters we are going to study. We need to
define the system’s variables that could affect the quality of the experiments
(e.g. number of traces, sampling frequency, filtering). For those variables,
one prescribes a minimum and a maximum value. Commonly, those values
depend on a huge number of factors, so consequently, it could be necessary
to perform several preliminary measurements to establish the right values.
Once the variables are defined and bounded, we must choose three of them;
the three variables that are most likely to affect the results of the experiment.
The rest of them will be fixed to some constant values (e.g. their minimum
and maximum). To illustrate this, in the “Measure” section of our use cases,
(i.e. Sect. 3.3, 4.3, and 5.4), the reader can find Tables 3, 10, and 18 with
“Defined variables”, with all the considered variables, and Tables 4, 7, and
12 with the 3 chosen as “Working variables” along with its minimum and
maximum values for each respective case.
– Analyze the data obtained from the process, and determine its relationships
with the problem. This step consists of experimentation i.e., crafting an
experiment or Design of Experiments (DoE). DoE is a branch of applied
statistics, which is responsible for evaluating the factors (or variables) that
influence a parameter or group of parameters. Note that in this paper we
do not explain DoE in detail, but we refer interested readers to [26], and
[15]. The objective is to quantify which variables have more influence over
the experiment and adjust them to the proper values. To do that, a DoE
with the 3 selected working variables to perform 8 experiments is chosen.
The output of it gives the coefficient to each variable, which tells us if the
effect is positive or negative (improves or not the result of the experiment)
and how strong each one in comparison with the others is. In the “Analyze
section” of use cases (Sect. 3.4, Sect. 4.4, and Sect. 5.5) the output of each
DoE can be observed with more detail.
– Improve the current process using the analysis of the root causes done in
the previous step to identify, test and implement a solution for the problems
that appeared. In this customized Six Sigma, the step consists of the analysis
of the experimental design’s results. Here one adjusts the identified working
variables that have more influence over the experiments. Afterwards, one
performs many rounds of the experiment (at least 2 times), to ensure that
the results are not altered due to any failure. If this is not the case, a new
setup is designed considering those results. If the results are not good enough
(even after the 8 experiments), the process should be repeated from the
previous step, considering to change the selected variables or adjust their
minimum and maximum values. This is considered as one iteration. The idea
is to perform several iterations between these two last steps until the main
objective is reached. Practical examples of this analysis of the results and
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the readjustment of the DoE variables are shown in the “Improve” section
of our use cases (Sect. 3.5, Sect. 4.5, and Sect. 5.6).
– Control the newly improved process to correct any undesired deviations of
it. Repeat the steps until obtaining the desired quality level. This step does
not strictly apply to our problem, but it can be understood as the action of
taking notes of the results to apply in futures experiments.
As mentioned above, the proposed methodology can be used to optimize ac-
quisition, leakage assessment, attack evaluation, and parameter selection. Below
we describe those four use cases using this customized Six Sigma methodology in
different scenarios. The first use case is also taken as an explanatory one, which
means that it is explained in more detail than the rest.
3 Use case 1: Improving the acquisition phase
In this section the proposed method is presented and explained step by step,
giving examples for the procedures done with our experimental setup to optimize
the acquisition process over a real device. First of all, we briefly describe the
presented use case, then we divide the section into 5 steps following the DMAIC
scheme.
3.1 Use case description
The target is an external I2C device (slave). We are storing data (8-bit values)
in an external I2C memory using the STM32F4 32-bit microcontroller (master).
During the storage operation, the I2C device’s power consumption is being mea-
sured with a current probe. As evaluators, we would like to know whether it is
possible to find dependency between the stored data and the power consump-
tion, allowing an attacker to perform SCA. We use a proper experimental setup
to do that and we apply our customized Six Sigma methodology, to optimize the
acquisition setup.
After a few preliminary acquisitions (taken with the setup shown in Table 2)
we did not learn much about the point in time when the data was being stored,
and we were not able to obtain any correlation between the stored data and the
power traces. Then, we used our customized Six Sigma methodology to improve
the acquisition setup and to obtain a significant correlation spike, identifying the
exact point of time in which the 8-bit value was being stored in memory (Figure
4).
3.2 Define
First, the Device-Under-Test (DUT) should be studied by an analyst to get fa-
miliar with it. Although this process should be always done prior to any SCA
experiment, it is crucial for the “black-box” testing use cases, since its results
might be the only source of information about the DUT. From this analysis,
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enough information should be gathered to define the following: the acquisition
setup’s requirements, the goal of analyzing the acquired data, and the OK-
criterion. We propose several steps for this preliminary analysis. Note that this
use case is for handling devices whose internals are mostly unknown, while ex-
amining side-channel leakage from them (e.g., “black-box” testing or an attack
scenario). Most of these steps can be avoided if there is enough information
about the internal behavior (such as in a “white-box” testing scenario in which
a complete control of the device is assumed).
a. Define the basis of the unknown system, assuming some basic information is
known. Usually, there are some known characteristics like its purpose, manu-
facturer, inputs and outputs, how much power (externally) it consumes, etc.
Everything that is clearly known (and not guessed), should be written down
as a list, as it is a starting point for the questions about characteristics of the
system that are (still) unknown. For instance: Does the manufacturer uses
standard architectures? What are the operations that the power consump-
tion depends on? What operations are performed with the input data? Part
of the answers on those questions can determine some of the initial parame-
ters of the acquisition setup, like the voltage scale in what the measurements
should be done.
b. Analyse all the official (device data sheet) and unofficial documentation that
can be obtained, trying to infer the details of the internal architecture that
are not explicitly mentioned by the manufacturer.
c. Apply non-invasive analysis techniques on it, like measuring the voltage and
performing a Fourier analysis, to learn the working frequency. There are also
invasive or more destructive techniques possible but they are out of scope
here, since we focus on passive analysis.
d. Finally, the experts’ knowledge on similar devices can be helpful, but it is
not mandatory.
After the analysis, one has to summarize the gathered information, enhanc-
ing the basic knowledge about the system with the new information obtained
through the comparison of documentation, the non-invasive analysis and the
opinion of the experts. In our use case, first the data sheet provided by the
manufacturer was read and thoroughly analyzed. After that, the process of get-
ting system’s details mainly consisted of voltage measuring and performing a
frequency analysis, from which a few different frequencies were identified. Both
processes were accomplished by a person with some expertise in the field, and
the results were discussed with the expert in electronic devices of the team.
Once the DUT has been thoroughly studied, we can use this information to
define the requirements of the acquisition setup, the main goal of the experiment
and the OK-criterion:
Requirements of the setup: We interpret this as the initial parameters of
the acquisition setup, which are not supposed to change during all the steps of
the process. For instance, these parameters could be (but not strictly): opera-
tional parameters of the target, acquisition/analysis tools, physical properties
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studied (e.g., power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, and timing), type
of the SCA technique implemented, etc. If, while applying the process something
suggests to change this data, this should be taken into account, continuing the
process until the end, and adding those changes in a future iteration. The setup
requirements for our use case are given in Table 1.
Main goal: Here we define the goal that we want to achieve. In our case, the
experiment was to obtain and visualize a dependency between the stored 8-bit
values and the power consumption.
OK-criterion: This is the quantification of the goal, a factor that tells us
whether the experiments are conclusive or not. During the experiments one tries
to tune several parameters obtaining different results through iterations, so the
OK-criterion indicates when to stop the Six Sigma performance. Also, it tells
when we have reached our objectives. In this use case, the OK-criterion (Table
1) is to obtain a significant correlation spike (in comparison to the correlation
obtained in non-leaking parts of the signal), indicating that in fact there is a
data-dependency with the power consumption of the device. Moreover, we can
compute the Confidence intervals for a sample (Pearson) coefficient value
[30] to establish a concrete threshold. With a sample size of 1k and an observed
correlation of approximately ±0.05 (in the non leaking parts), our confidence
interval (99.99%) is from -0.1705 to 0.1705 (considering positive and negative
correlation values). This means that if the observed correlation is out of that
range, we can assume that there exists a significant statistical difference.
Table 1. Goal and OK-criterion
Goal Find correlation between the power traces and the stored data
Requirements – Same setup and device operational parameters fixed
an constant in each experiment
– Oscilloscope: LeCroy Waverunner 9104
– SW for the acquisition, signal processing and data
analysis
– Current probe
OK-criterion Significant correlation spike (r) [Where (r ≤ −0.1705) ∩ (r ≥
0.1705)]
After having defined the basic requirements for the acquisition setup, the
goal of acquiring the data, and the OK-criterion to evaluate the improvement
on the results the measurement step can be started.
3.3 Measure
Following the requirements defined in the previous step, the usual measurement
setup is parametrized, and a first preliminary round of acquisitions is started
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with this basic setup. This basic setup consists of the following tools configured
as stated below (Table 2).
Table 2. Tools list and brief description.
LeCroy
Waverunner 9104
Oscilloscope
– 2 channels (Power consumption & triggering)
– 20 GS/s (Single sample capture mode)
– I2C bus-based triggering
The DUT – Handled by an STM32F411-DISCO developing
board (I2C based communication)
– Power supplied through the STM32F411-DISCO de-
veloping board
PC – Communicates with the STM32F411-DISCO devel-
oping board
– Controls the oscilloscope
Current Probe – Tektronix CT1 current probe
– Conected in series with the DUT power line
– Measure the power consumption
With this baseline setup, a round of random 8-bit values are sent to the
DUT from the computer (through the STM32F4 developing board), while the
oscilloscope triggers in the I2C clock line (SCL), just after finishing the com-
munication, when the internal computation in the DUT is supposed to start.
The main goal of this step is to define the system’s variables that we are going
to study. To ensure quality traces, the evaluator acquires a couple of hundreds
of them, and in those he might also discover defects or inconvenient features.
Accordingly, he/she might decide to tune further some parameters to improve
the results. The parameters can be different in nature (environment, processing,
measurement, etc.). Also, there are some parameters that can be considered in
most of the cases (Lowpass filtering, number of traces, compression techniques,
etc.) while other parameters will depend on the specific use case.
After prompting all the possible parameters that need further tuning, the
expert should evaluate and order them by their potential being more significant
for improving the quality of the traces. For each parameter a minimum and
a maximum values have to be specified (some parameters will be boolean but
others will have a range of possible values). Also, this list must be analyzed to
avoid the selection of parameters that can be dependent on each other. Table 3
gives the parameters with their descriptions and ranges. The top three variables
will be analyzed in the next step performing a DoE on them (Table 4). The
rest of the parameters have to be fixed in values between their minimum and
maximum.
3.4 Analyze
From the ordered list, the three top parameters are chosen, and a simple Design
of Experiments (DoE [15]) process is carried out. In our case, we choose a two
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Table 3. Defined variables
Rank Parameter Description Range Fixed Value
1 Point of
Alignment
Two interesting places in the
traces to search for correlation
are observed
Align at the
start vs at
the end
2 LowPass
Filter (SW)
Filtering the signal or not would
affect the quality of the col-
lected traces. We should elim-
inate high frequency noise but
without destroying the leakage.
Filtering vs
No filtering
3 Standard-
ization
Removing the mean of the data
set can help to improve the re-
sults.
Yes vs No
4 No of traces The number of traces affects to
the confidence of the results but
increases the computational ef-
fort
1k vs 100k 1k
5 Compress-ion Compression can be used to re-
duce the dataset size and to im-
prove the leakage (close points
carry very similar information
and noise can be reduced). Con-
versely, leakage can also be de-
stroyed because of compression.
compression
vs no
compression
No
compression
6 Sampling
frequency
A high sampling frequency will
improve the quality of the traces
but also increase the data size
50MHz vs
20GHz
1 GHz
level DoE with 3 variables (called factors in experimental design) for its simplicity
and reliability. Therefore, 3 variables are investigated in two levels by performing
23 experiments as follows:
1. Create an experiment matrix for all possible combinations of parameters
2. Select the two most suitable values (or minimum and maximum) for each
selected parameter.
3. Enter the selected parameter values in the matrix.
4. Proceed to acquire the traces of the 8 experiments.
5. Process these traces in the selected SCA suite and write down the results.
6. Calculate the Effect and Coefficient of each parameter with the following
formula:
Effect =
∑4
i=1 Maximumi −
∑4
i=1 Minimumi
Coefficient = c =
Effect
2
(1)
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7. Calculate the Effect and Coefficient of the interactions between the param-
eters with the following formula:
Effect =
∑4
i=1 positiveInteractioni −
∑4
i=1 negativeInteractioni
Coefficient = c =
Effect
2
(2)
Note: the sign of the interaction is the product of the code for the parameter
levels: Minimum = −1, Maximum = 1.
8. Finally, calculate the results applying the DoE formula using the Coefficients
for each factor.
DoE =
∑8
i=1
Ri
8 +cA∗A+cB ∗B+cC ∗C+cAB∗AB+cAC ∗AC+cAC ∗AC
9. Optionally, the results can be plotted with a Pareto Chart, for their better
understanding (Fig. 2, right).
10. It is recommended to do more than one round of experiments with the same
permutation list to compute the confidence of the results getting the variance
σ and indicating the error.
Table 4. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Point of alignment Align at the start Align at the end
B LowPass filter (Software) false true
C Standardization false true
Table 5. Experiment definition and order
Experiment A Value B Value C Value
1 - start - false - false
2 - start - false + true
3 - start + true - false
4 - start + true + true
5 + end - false - false
6 + end - false + true
7 + end + true - false
8 + end + true + true
If the results of this process do not show a clear gain in any of the parameters,
the next parameters in the ordered list are selected and the DoE applied again.
In the case of our experimental setup, we were not able to find any correlation
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with the basic setup (Fig. 4). Some misalignments and very noisy signals were
detected, so the three parameters shown in Table 4 were selected. The DoE was
applied again creating 8 experiments with the limit in values as shown in Table
5. Note that the order of the experiment must follow exactly the one given in the
table. Although the results will not be the optimal ones, it is important to finish
the set of 8 experiments without modifying any of the variables or its range. The
results will be analyzed in the following step, taking into consideration whether
it is mandatory to readjust them and make another iteration.
Table 6. The first experiment set results.
Experiment A Value B Value C Value AB Value AC Value BC Value Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Std. Dev. Average
1 - -1 - -1 - -1 + 1 + 1 + 1 0.0724 0.0808 0.0685 0.0063 0.0739
2 - -1 - -1 + 1 + 1 - -1 - -1 0.0726 0.0811 0.0612 0.0100 0.0716
3 - -1 + 1 - -1 - -1 + 1 - -1 0.0570 0.0748 0.0631 0.0090 0.0650
4 - -1 + 1 + 1 - -1 - -1 + 1 0.0597 0.0645 0.0664 0.0034 0.0636
5 + 1 - -1 - -1 - -1 - -1 + 1 0.1424 0.2098 0.1703 0.0339 0.1741
6 + 1 - -1 + 1 - -1 + 1 - -1 0.1428 0.2112 0.1707 0.0344 0.1749
7 + 1 + 1 - -1 + 1 - -1 - -1 0.1292 0.1634 0.1353 0.0182 0.1426
8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 0.1294 0.1645 0.1351 0.0188 0.1430
Effect 0.0901 -0.0201 -0.0006 -0.0116 0.0012 0.0001
Coefficient 0.0451 -0.0101 -0.0003 -0.0058 0.0006 0.0001
After acquiring and processing the traces the “Round 1” column in Table
6 was filled in and the highest correlation level is obtained between the stored
data and the power traces. It should be noticed that, as mentioned above, the
set of 8 experiments has been performed another 2 times (columns “Round 2”
and “Round 3”) to ensure that the results are consistent. The coefficients are
calculated with the averaged data (column “Average”).
Fig. 2. Coefficients and interactions of the DoE (left) and Pareto chart (right)
After applying Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) we derived the “Coefficients” of the tuning
of the parameters and their interactions. The effect that each parameter has can
be seen in Fig. 2 (left). Also, in Fig. 2 (right) we show how “vital few” variables
have more influence over the results than the “trivial many” variables. This
effect it is also known as the 80/20 rule, stating that, for many events, the 80%
of consequences come from 20% of causes. This has become a popular maxim
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in several fields like economics, production, business, computer science, etc. For
instance, Lowell Arthur noted that, in computing, the 20% of the code has 80%
of the errors. Also, he discovered that the 80% of a particular piece of software
can be written in 20% of the total allocated time [29]. More examples can be
found in literature [12]. In this case the cumulative line crosses the line of 80%
with the first variable, what basically means that the point of alignment is the
only variable which is affecting the results in a significant way (it has almost the
80% of the influence in the results). At this point, we have one set of the results
and hence the factors of Eq. (3) given by DoE. The parameters A, B, and C
are given in Table 4 so the results given by Eq. (3) mean that our experiment
has better results when the Point of alignment is Align at the end and not
when LowPass filter is applied. In this setup the Standardization effect is
negligible.
(3)DoE = 0.101 + 0.035 ∗A− 0.007 ∗B + 0.0004 ∗ C
+ 0.0002 ∗AB − 0.0003 ∗AC + 0.0003 ∗BC
3.5 Improve
With the information derived in the previous steps, the expert should analyze the
results of DoE, interpret them, and decide if they are good enough to implement
them in the acquisition setup (the OK-Criterium assists in this task). The expert
can also dig deeper in his interpretation of the data and propose modifications
in the range of some parameter(s), because he/she can derive from the results
that the best approach might be keeping a better balance between the different
parameters, instead of using the limited values for some of them. In this last
case, the effect of the interactions can be very relevant to make a decision. On
the other hand, if the decision is to discard the proposed changes, two options
are left: go back to Step 3 (Analyze) and perform another iteration of DoE,
making changes directly in the definition step based on the gathered knowledge;
or perform the side-channel evaluation of the DUT with the baseline setup.
Table 7. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Number of traces 3000 5000
B Windowed resample false true
C Standardization false true
As it can be noticed in Table 6, aligning at the end of the operation allows
us to find better correlation values (approximately 0.1 larger values). We see
some significant correlation spikes in comparison with the correlation obtained
in non-leaking parts of the signal, but the correlation level is still too low (only
the correlation in Experiments 5 and 6 is barely out of the confidence interval).
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Table 8. Results of the three experimental rounds
Exp A B C Round 1 Round 2 Round3 Std. Dev. Average
1 3k false false 0.5754 0.5649 0.6008 0.0185 0.5804
2 3k false true 0.5768 0.5691 0.6059 0.0194 0.5839
3 3k true false 0.5665 0.5805 0.6079 0.0210 0.5850
4 3k true true 0.5708 0.5855 0.6146 0.0223 0.5903
5 5k false false 0.5959 0.6031 0.6276 0.0166 0.6089
6 5k false true 0.5990 0.6078 0.6308 0.0164 0.6126
7 5k true false 0.6073 0.5978 0.6151 0.0086 0.6067
8 5k true true 0.6115 0.6054 0.6178 0.0062 0.6116
Thus, we decided to perform another iteration (another DoE) modifying some
variables, as shown in Table 7. We fix the variable “point of the alignment” in its
maximum value (align at the end). In other words, we improved the alignment
with the focus in the leaking part of the signal. As we obtained better results
without applying a lowpass filter, we fix that variable (no lowpass filter) and
we add two new variables to analyze (Number of traces, and Compression tech-
nique). We keep the variable Standardization to discover whether it can improve
the results with the new point of alignment. Repeating the same steps (but with
the three new variables) we obtained the results shown in Table 8.
Fig. 3. Coefficients and interactions (left) and Pareto chart (right)
These results show that our experiment has better results when the number
of power traces is 5 000, using a compression technique (Windowed resam-
ple = true) and using Standardization. Observe that the variable with more
effect over the obtained correlation is the number of traces. Also, with this setup
the results are slightly better using standardization, contrary to previous setup.
It must be mentioned that with this setup the alignment has been improved
(due to the results of the previous iteration) and the OK-criterium has been
accomplished in all the experiments. Fig. 4 shows the differences between the
traces taken with the preliminary setup and the traces obtained with the opti-
mized setup. In the bottom chart named Correlation (improved setup) a high
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Fig. 4. Correlation results
correlation spike can be seen at the end of the power trace, indicating the exact
place in which the 8-bit value is stored in memory.
3.6 Control
Although there is no process running that should be controlled (strictly speak-
ing), the recommendation is: document everything, every step taken, every guess
done, every clue discovered, etc. It is the key for having under control all the
processes described above, and also for future improvements that can be done
for this or other acquisition setups.
4 Use Case 2: Side-Channel Attack
In the previous section, we have shown how the proposed methodology is used for
optimizing the acquisition setup. In this section, we describe how this method-
ology can be used to optimize an attack scenario. As in the previous section,
we first briefly describe the presented use case, and then the 5 DMAIC scheme
steps are discussed (except the control step). As the basis of the methodology
have been already explained, we focus only on the results.
4.1 Use Case description
The target is an ATmega138P 8-bit microcontroller. Influenced by the result of
the previous use case, we want to perform a template attack over a different
device in a similar setup. We are storing data (8-bit values) in flash memory
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using a memcpy() operation (in a random address each time). During that op-
eration, we take measurements of the power consumption of the device. As an
attacker, our goal is to obtain the exact 8-value loaded in flash memory using
template attacks [6,31,8]. Using our customized Six Sigma methodology we have
been able to successfully recover the 8-bit value performing template attacks.
We performed two different phases: a profiling phase, and an attack phase. In
the profiling phase we modeled the side-channel power consumption of the de-
vice during the memcpy() operation (taking measurements of the device loading
random values into the memory), then in the attack phase we were able to guess
a (fixed) secret 8-bit value. Since performing a template attack is a complex
process with lots of variables involved, we show how our customized Six Sigma
methodology can help to optimize the attacking process.
4.2 Define
As mentioned above, the main goal of this phase is to define the setup require-
ments, see Table 9. For us, the main goal is to obtain an 8-bit value loaded into
memory by using template attacks. The OK-criterium indicates that the correct
key guess obtains a rank of 5 or less using template attacks. Table 9 shows the
setup’s requirements.
Table 9. Goal and OK-criterion
Goal Successfully obtain the 8 bits loaded into memory using template
attacks
Requirements – Same setup and device operational parameters fixed
and constant in each experiment
– Two sets of traces: one with random data (profil-
ing phase) and other with constant data (attacking
phase)
– Oscilloscope: LeCroy Waverunner 9104
– SW for the acquisition, signal processing and data
analysis
– Current probe
OK-criterion The correct candidate obtains a rank of 5 or less using template
attacks
4.3 Measure
With the baseline setup shown in Table 11, a round of 8-bit random values are
sent to the DUT by the computer through the serial port, while the oscilloscope
is triggered with a GPIO controlled by the ATmega platform, just after finishing
the communication, when the internal computation in the DUT is supposed to
start. We set the range of the system’s variables, and select three of them to
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Table 10. Defined variables
Rank Parameter Description Range Fixed Value
1 Standard-
ization
Removing the mean of the data
set can help to improve the re-
sults.
Yes vs No
2 Points of
Interest No
The selected POI will affect the
templates and therefore the at-
tack. We must select an optimal
number of points of interest.
1 vs 3
3 LowPass
Filter (SW)
To filter the signal or not would
affect the quality of the col-
lected traces and the leakage.
We should eliminate high fre-
quency noise but without de-
stroying the leakage
With SW
filter vs
Without SW
filter
4 No Traces
Profiling
Number of processed traces
used for the profiling phase of
the template attack
1k vs 100k 20k
5 No Traces
Attack
Number of processed traces
used for the attacking phase of
the template attack
1k vs 10k 1k
6 Alignment When we align, we can choose
different points as a reference.
Start vs End Start
7 POI selection
function
We can use different functions
to select the points of inter-
est of the traces (SOST [17],
SOSD [17], SNR [24], CORRE-
LATION [21]
SOST vs
SNR
SOST
8 Compression
technique
(Windowed
resample)
A compression technique can
be used to reduce the dataset
size and to improve the leakage
(close points carry very similar
information and noise can be
reduced). Conversely, in some
cases leakage can be destroyed.
With
compression
vs without
compression
No
compression
9 Sampling
Frequency
A high sampling frequency will
improve the quality of the traces
but also increase the data size
100MHz vs
1GHz
1 GHz
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check the effect they have in the success of the attack. Table 10 presents the
variables considered for this experiment.
Table 11. Tools list and brief description.
LeCroy
Waverunner 9104
Oscilloscope
– 2 channels (Power consumption & triggering)
– 20 GS/s (Single sample capture mode)
The DUT – Generates trigger trough GPIO
– Power source: continuous power supply
– Communicates with PC via serial por
PC – Communicates with the ATmega138P
– Controls the oscilloscope
Current Probe – Tektronix CT1 current probe
– Conected in series with the DUT power line
– Measure the power consumption
4.4 Analyze
Table 12 shows the three top variables to use in the DoE, creating 8 experiments.
For each experiment 10 k traces of random data were captured for the profiling
phase and 1k traces of constant data were captured for the attack phase. The
experiments and their results are given in Table 13. The parameters A, B, and
C are given in Fig. 5 (left) so the outcomes mean that our experiment has better
results when the Number of Points of Interest is 3, and when we apply a
LowPass filter, and Standardization. We can see that the number of POI is
the variable with more effect in the results, but in this case variables A and C
have also a significant effect (see Fig. 5 (right)).
Fig. 5. Coefficients and interactions (left) and Pareto chart (right)
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Table 12. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Standardization false true
B No POI 1 3
C Lowpass Filter (SW) false true
Table 13. Results of the three experimental rounds
Exp A B C Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Std. Dev. Average
1 false 1 false 46 63 42 27 47 27 13.65 42
2 false 1 true 24 71 27 37 41 22 18.25 37
3 false 3 false 8 17 7 2 4 34 11.95 12
4 false 3 true 5 13 3 2 3 4 4.05 5
5 true 1 false 79 23 26 24 31 23 22.09 34.33
6 true 1 true 41 1 21 19 13 19 13.02 19
7 true 3 false 23 16 2 5 5 32 11.96 13,83
8 true 3 true 9 9 5 1 2 2 3.61 4,67
4.5 Improve
We reached the OK-criterium only in Experiment 8. Since we consider it a very
poor result, we moved forward to increase the success rate and we performed
another DoE iteration. Then, we redefined the 3 variables as shown in Table 14.
Table 14. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Strength of the lowpass filter 1 10
B No POI 3 5
C No Traces Profiling phase 5 k 15 k
Table 15. Results of the three experimental rounds
Exp A B C Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Std. Dev. Average
1 1 3 5k 4 22 7 102 46.18 33.75
2 1 3 15k 3 2 4 1 1.29 2.5
3 1 5 5k 3 26 4 112 51.60 36.25
4 1 5 15k 1 4 1 1 1.50 1.75
5 10 3 5k 1 15 4 30 13.13 12.5
6 10 3 15k 2 1 2 1 0.58 1.5
7 10 5 5k 3 15 2 32 13.98 13
8 10 5 15k 2 1 2 1 0.58 1.5
We modified the variable Lowpass Filter to Strength of the lowpass
filter in order to obtain the proper value for characterizing the filter. Also, we
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wanted to know if adding more POI could improve the attack so we modified the
range (from 3 to 5). Moreover, we decided to check if by using more traces one
could improve the attack significantly, so we added the parameter No Traces
Profiling phase. Table 15 shows the experiment definition and the results. Note
that the OK-criterium was reached in the half of the experiments (experiments
with 15 k traces for profiling phase), so we can consider our main goal reached.
Again, the parameters A, B, and C are given in Figure 6 (left), and this time
the outcomes show that our experiment has better results whit 15 k Traces
for Profiling phase and Standardization. Note that adding more POI does
not improve the results in a significant way, so it is not worth increasing the
computational effort required by adding more POI. In Figure 6 (right), we see
that the variables with more impact to the results are the Number of Traces
for Profiling phase (47.8%) and Standardization (24.8%).
Fig. 6. Coefficients and interactions (left) and Pareto chart (right)
5 Use Case 3: Leakage Assessment (Statistical tests)
The following use case shows how our customized Six Sigma methodology can
be used in a side-channel evaluation scenario to optimize the leakage assess-
ment process with traditional statistical tests (e.g. t-test and X 2-test). We first
present a short overview of the current leakage assessment methodologies. Then
we describe our use case and the 5 DMAIC scheme steps.
5.1 Leakage Assessment Methodologies: why is it necessary?
The need for integration and validation of countermeasures against side-channel
attacks on embedded devices earned quite some attention in recent years. Cur-
rent certification process like EMVCo[13] or Common Criteria (CC)[9] evaluate
the robustness of a DUT by directly attacking it with different side-channels
techniques (e.g. differential power analysis [22], correlation power analysis [5],
mutual information analysis [16,1], template attacks [6,31,8], deep learning-based
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attacks [23,28,25], etc.). Nevertheless, the increasing amount of attacks, possible
algorithms, distinguishers and models make this kind of evaluation infeasible, in
a low-cost and efficient manner, specially for less experienced evaluators.
To overcome those drawbacks, several leakage assessment techniques have
arisen in recent times with the purpose of determining, whether a device leaks
information through side channels in a quick and simple way. These tests alone
are not enough for evaluating a device against SCA, since they do not quantify
the leakage or give any clue about its exploitability, but are good for a prelimi-
nary (“black-box”) evaluation. The most popular one is the Test Vector Leakage
Assessment (TVLA) methodology by Cryptography Research (CRI) [18,20,2].
The approach is to use a statistical test (commonly Welch’s t-test or Pearson’s
X 2-test [27]) to distinguish whether two sets of data (e.g.random vs fixed) are
significantly different. However, performing TVLA properly is not a trivial task,
since there are lots of possible choices and variables to tune. Thus, we propose
to use our methodology to improve the leakage assessment process by helping to
tune its parameters.
5.2 Use Case description
Our target is an STM32F417 32-bit microcontroller implementing a software
AES-128 implementation [10,14,3]. As evaluators, our goal is to detect leakage
with the least amount of resources possible (fast and efficient). Essentially, what
we want to do is to prove that there exists a dependency between the data pro-
cessed by the cryptographic algorithm and the power consumption. Commonly,
the DUT is fed with two differentiated types of data (fixed vs fixed, fixed vs ran-
dom, semi-fixed vs random, etc.) and the evaluator tries to confirm that there
exists a significant statistical difference between both sets of traces.
As mentioned above, the TVLA is the main statistical tool used in side-
channel leakage detection since it is fast and versatile. However, it can also bring
up false positives [34]. For this reason, in real scenario evaluations, a semi-fixed
vs random test is performed (instead of a fixed vs random test), and also for the
same reason new suggested evaluation techniques are published [11,32,27,35].
In other words, instead of feeding the cryptographic device with fixed values,
we generate specific test vectors which force a certain intermediate value (or its
Hamming Weight) to remain constant. Then we compare this power consump-
tion, with the one generated when the device is encrypting fully random values.
The usage of semi-fixed vectors makes the TVLA test more reliable, but it in-
creases the complexity of the evaluation with more parameters to tune. For this
reason, our customized Six Sigma fits also perfectly in this use case.
5.3 Define
Table 16 shows the main goal and OK-criterion of the phase. Here, the main
goal is to detect leakage on an AES-128 bit software implementation running
on an STM32F417 microcontroller. Thus, the OK-Criterium in this use case is
to obtain a p-value greater than p = 10−5, the common threshold in leakage
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Table 16. Goal and OK-criterion
Goal Detect leakage on an AES-128 bit software implementation
Requirements – Same setup and device operational parameters fixed
and constant in each experiment
– Two sets of traces: one with random data and other
with semi-constant data
– Oscilloscope: LeCroy Waverunner 9104
– SW for the acquisition, signal processing and data
analysis
– Current probe
OK-criterion Obtain a p-value greater than 10−5 at the same time in two
different sets of samples
assessment evaluation. This value is equivalent to the widely used threshold of
4.5 in t-test. After the acquisition, a statistical test (t-test or X 2-test) over the
samples is run. It is important to perform the statistical test over two different
sets of data (taken with the same setup), to confirm that the leakage appears in
both sets of data at the same time.
5.4 Measure
With the baseline setup parameters as in Table 17, a round of random or semi-
fixed 128-bit values (randomly interleaved) are sent to the DUT by the computer
trough the serial port, while the oscilloscope is triggered with a GPIO controlled
by the DUT, just after finishing the communication (when the internal compu-
tation in the DUT is supposed to begin). We evaluate the system’s variables,
and select three of them to check the effect they have in the success of the attack
(Table 18). In this case, we have selected the three variables shown in Table 19.
We want to know which fixed intermediate value produces higher p-values, so we
Table 17. Tools list and brief description.
LeCroy
Waverunner 9104
Oscilloscope
– 2 channels (Power consumption & triggering)
– 20 GS/s (Single sample capture mode)
The DUT – Generates trigger trough GPIO
– Power supplied through external batteries
– Communicates with PC via serial port
PC – Communicates with the STM32F417 microcon-
troller
– Controls the oscilloscope
– Generates random data to encrypt
Current Probe – Tektronix CT1 current probe
– Connected in series with the DUT power line
– Measure the power consumption
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Table 18. Defined variables
Rank Parameter Description Range Fixed Value
1 Intermediate
value
Semi-fixed traces are generated
such that certain intermediate
value Hamming Weight is al-
ways between a range. The in-
termediate value targeted can
have an influence in the leakage
detection.
SubBytes vs
AddRound-
Key
2 HW range The HW range of the generated
semi-fixed traces can have an in-
fluence in the leakage detection
40-60 vs
80-100
3 Statistical
test
Although the t-test is consid-
ered to be the main statisti-
cal tool in side channel detec-
tion, recently the X 2-test for
the same purpose has been pro-
posed. The usage of one statis-
tical tool or another can have
clear influence in the obtained
results.
t-test vs
X 2-test
4 Test Vector The nature of the test vector
may affect the results. We could
use the classical fixed vs random
approach or we can generate
specific vectors which force the
HW of one intermediate value
”Fixed vs
random” VS
“Semi-Fixed
vs random”
Semi-Fixed
vs random
5 Number of
traces
The number of traces affects the
confidence of the results. In this
case in each experiment we need
two sets of traces taken with the
same setup
1k vs 100k 5k
6 Standard-
ization
Removing the mean of the data
set can help to improve the re-
sults.
Yes vs No With stan-
dardization
7 Compression
(Windowed
resample)
A compression technique can be
used to reduce the data set size
and improve the leakage (close
points carry similar information
and noise can be reduced). Con-
versely, in some cases leakage
can be destroyed.
With
compression
vs without
compression
No
compression
8 Alignment When we align, we can choose
different points as a reference.
Start vs End Start
9 LowPass
Filter (SW)
To filter the signal or not would
affect the quality of the col-
lected traces and the leakage.
We should eliminate high fre-
quency noise but without de-
stroying the leakage
With SW
filter vs
Without SW
filter
Without
LowPass
filter
10 Sampling
Frequency
A high sampling frequency will
improve the quality of the traces
but also increase the data size.
50MHz vs
20GHz
1 GHz
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select variable A (Intermediate Value). Also, we want to select the proper Ham-
ming Weight range for the semi-fixed set (for the selected intermediate value).
Finally, we want to know which statistical test (t-test or X 2-test) works better
in this evaluation.
5.5 Analysis
In this step, the DoE was applied on the 3 aforementioned variables creating 8
experiments. The experiments and their results are presented in Table 20. The
parameters A, B, and C are given in Figure 7, and the outcomes mean that our
experiment has better results when the Intermediate value is SubBytes, the
HW range is 80-100 and we use the X 2-test for the experiment.
Table 19. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Intermediate value SubBytes AddRoundKey
B HW range 40-60 80-100
C Statistical test t-test X 2-test
Table 20. Results of the six experimental rounds
Exp A B C Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Std. Dev. Average
1 SubBytes 40-60 t-test 14.105 12.365 11.250 1.439 12.573
2 SubBytes 40-60 X 2-test 9.889 13.256 11.143 1.702 11.429
3 SubBytes 80-100 t-test 64.930 51.837 51.198 7.750 55.988
4 SubBytes 80-100 X 2-test 59.621 53.409 55.266 3.188 56.099
5 AddRoundKey 40-60 t-test 3.886 3.907 3.620 0.160 3.804
6 AddRoundKey 40-60 X 2-test 6.802 6.025 6.182 0.411 6.337
7 AddRoundKey 80-100 t-test 5.790 5.641 4.613 0.641 5.348
8 AddRoundKey 80-100 X 2-test 48.948 41.981 38.256 5.427 43.061
5.6 Improve
Since the OK-criterium has been reached in most of the experiments, it is not
necessary to perform another iteration of the DoE. We conclude that the device
leaks information through its power consumption. From the results of the previ-
ous step, it is noticeable that the output of SubBytes is leakier than the one of
AddRoundKey. Also, it can be seen that the higher Hamming Weight value we
fix for the semi-fixed dataset, the larger statistical differences are observed in the
traces. As it is observed in the Pareto chart (Figure 7) there are variables with
more effect than others, but the particularity is that the three of them have a
strong influence on the results. Conversely, it is known that X 2-test gives better
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results in the cases where the leakage has multivariate behaviour. Nevertheless,
its authors confirmed that the technique is feasible also in univariate cases (our
case)[27]. In our experiment while using the t-test, we were not able to exceed
the threshold by fixing the HW of the AddRoundKey operation with 5000 traces.
Surprisingly, using X 2-test we were able to find leakage with the same number
of traces. In other words, in our experiments the X 2-test was more sensitive
and allowed us to detect differences better than t-test. Thus, although X 2-test
requires more computational effort, using it improves the results in particular
cases (as it can be seen in Figure 8).
Fig. 7. Coefficients and interactions (left) and Pareto chart (right)
Fig. 8. Leakages of AddRoundKey intermediate value: t-test vs X 2-test (Experiments
7 and 8)
6 Use Case 4: Leakage Assessment (Deep Learning)
Recently, a new leakage assessment method based on deep learning has been
proposed [35]. Their idea is to train a neural network that works as a classi-
fier over the two sets of data (e.g. random vs fixed). If the neural network is
able to distinguish between these two sets of data, it can be assumed that they
are statistically different with a certain probability. Additionally, dealing with
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pre-processing problems like misalignment is becoming less problematic, if at all
needed. Conversely, the inclusion of deep neural networks to the leakage assess-
ment adds complexity to to the problem. In this section we show the viability
of our customized Six Sigma methodology in deep leaning leakage assessment,
helping to discern which is the best setup for this purpose.
6.1 Use Case description
For this case, the target, preliminary setup, and main goal are the same as in
the previous use case. The neural network has the same architecture as defined
in the original paper [35]. The set of “semi-fixed vs random” power traces is
divided into training and validation set. Then from the training set, we took
1k and 3k traces to train the model, and from the validation set (10k traces)
we compute a binomial test (as is suggested in the original paper) to obtain
a probability (p-value) that indicates whether there is a significant statistical
difference between the two set of traces (“semi-fixed vs random”).
Note that, the difference between the original experiment from the paper and
this one, is that we are using a microcontroller instead of an FPGA platform,
and a different encryption algorithm (AES-128 instead of PRESENT [4]).
6.2 Define
As mentioned above, the setup requirements, main goal and OK-criterium are
the same as in the previous use case (Sect. 5.3) and can be found in Table 16.
6.3 Measure
The baseline setup (Table 17) is also the same as in the previous use case in
Sect. 5.4. However, the leakage assessment method is completely different, and
thus, the defined variables too. It should be noted that general signal processing
variables that are (most of the time) considered in this step (Lowpass filtering,
number of traces, compression techniques, etc.) were not applied, since deep
learning approaches in SCA are often advocated by the needlessness of pre-
processing techniques. However, the authors in [35] propose standardizing the
training and validation sets to obtain a homogeneous range between all input
points and weights. Hence, we will consider standardizing as a variable in our
experiments to check whether this method improves the results of our use case.
Other considered variables are the number of traces used for training and valida-
tion, and the number of samples per trace in each one of them. Table 21 shows
the defined variables of this step.
6.4 Analysis
The DoE was applied on the three variables shown in Table 22 creating 8 exper-
iments. The experiments and their result are represented in the Table 23. Figure
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Table 21. Defined variables
Rank Parameter Description Range Fixed Value
1 Standardizing To reach a homogeneous range
between all input points and
weights, enabling efficient train-
ing
No vs Yes
2 No Samples
(per trace)
The number of samples will
have an influence in the num-
ber of neurons of the neural net-
work, which could have an im-
pact in the results.
2500 vs 5000
3 No Traces
(Training)
The number of traces used in
the training phase may affect to
the obtained p-values.
1000 vs 3000
4 No Traces
(Validation)
The number of traces used in
the validation phase may affect
to the obtained p-values.
1k vs 100k 10k
5 Neural
Network
Architecture
The architecture of the neural
network could affect to the ob-
tained probabilities. We can fol-
low the architecture proposed in
[35] or design our own.
Neural
Network
Sequential
Model vs
CNN
Neural
Network
Sequential
Model
Table 22. Working variables and values
ID Parameter 1st option (-) 2nd option (+)
A Standardizing No Standardizing Standardizing
B No Samples (per trace) 2500 5000
C No Traces (Training) 1000 3000
Table 23. Results of the six experimental rounds
Exp A B C Round 1 Round 2 Std. Dev. Average
1 No Standardizing 2k5 1k 299.25 415.13 81.940 357.19
2 No Standardizing 2k5 3k 910.65 956.40 32.350 933.53
3 No Standardizing 5k 1k 244.82 323.01 55.289 283.91
4 No Standardizing 5k 3k 763.51 910.65 104.044 837.08
5 Standardizing 2k5 1k 208.35 206.70 1.167 207.52
6 Standardizing 2k5 3k 667.50 729.90 44.123 698.70
7 Standardizing 5k 1k 148.04 169.00 14.821 158.52
8 Standardizing 5k 3k 638.05 686.51 34.266 662.28
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7 shows parameters A, B, and C. The outcomes mean that our experiment has
better results with No Standardizing, using 2500 samples per trace and
3k traces for training.
Fig. 9. Coefficients and interactions (left) and Pareto chart (right)
6.5 Improve
Since the OK-criterium has been reached in all the experiments, it is not neces-
sary to perform another iteration of the DoE. From the results of the previous
step, we conclude that the number of training traces is the parameter which
has more effect on the obtained p-value, as it can be seen in the Pareto Chart
(Figure 9 (right)). Note that, applying the standardizing technique does not im-
prove the results. In this particular case, comparing the same experiments with
and without standardizing the traces, we obtain slightly better results without
standardizing as pre-processing. However, it is not necessarily conclusive that
the pre-processing is not required.
7 Conclusion
Our results when using this customized Six Sigma methodology, demonstrate
the suitability of this method for improving the SCA process in its different
stages; from the basis of the process (which is improving the quality of the ac-
quired side-channel measurement) to the performance of any kind of side-channel
attack or leakage assessment technique. Moreover, we have shown how our Six
Sigma methodology can reduce the uncertainty associated with the SCA, helping
technicians to interpret the results and discover root causes of the phenomena
occurred during the process. During the process, the evaluator identifies the pa-
rameters that have more influence in the results of a certain experiment and is
able to adjust them to an optimal value.
The methodology steps proposed are simple, methodical and very helpful
when dealing with security evaluations. This approach can be helpful to any
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researcher or security evaluator in a lab; it allows technicians without a deep
knowledge of all the basics involved in these methods, to implement and interpret
side-channel evaluations properly. The methodology can also be used by experts
when dealing with new tasks (e.g. regarding to new devices, attacks or leakage
assessment methods), as in such a case methodology could guide the evaluator
to find the best set of variables and speed-up the evaluation process.
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